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This article argues that similar conflict characteristics form links between crises, which signal 
the relevant actors, i.e., the belligerents and the potential mediator(s), that a comparable 
approach in terms of third-party mediation could be suitable across these disputes – even if 
the relevant parties are not the same. That is, demand (antagonists) and supply-side actors 
(mediators) are likely to employ the heuristic of learning from and emulating the mediation 
behavior in similar crises. The empirical analysis, employing data from the International 
Crisis Behavior project, shows that comparable patterns in violence, arguably the most visible 
and salient conflict characteristic, are associated with mediation traveling across crises; other 
dispute characteristics incorporated into spatial lags are not, however. Hence, particularly as 
domestic/unit-level (monadic) influences are controlled for, the effect of common exposure is 
taken into account, and different estimation strategies are used, the results emphasize that 
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If a crisis’s belligerents cannot find a peaceful solution themselves, international mediation is 
a frequently used tool.2 Mediation is driven by both demand and supply (Beardsley & Greig, 
2009), and the existing literature identifies several associated factors that influence a 
conflict’s chances to see mediation (e.g., Greig, 2005; Greig & Regan, 2008; Wallensteen & 
Svensson, 2014). However, this work largely focused on ‘domestic’ or ‘unit/crisis-specific’ 
determinants, i.e., monadic factors such as the belligerents’ level of democracy. Arguments 
for ‘trans-unit’ influences, i.e., mechanisms suggesting that characteristics of one conflict 
influence the chances of mediation in another, have largely been neglected. Do such trans-
unit influences exist?  
The policy diffusion literature emphasizes that actors in one national context may be 
influenced by actors in other states (e.g., Elkins & Simmons, 2005; Gilardi, 2012). I 
correspondingly argue that, in their search for an effective strategy to end a conflict, conflict 
parties (demand side) and/or the potential mediator (supply side) learn from and emulate 
other, similar crises. Focusing on similarity as a link between two crises i and j is a useful 
heuristic, helping the actors on both the demand and supply side to make difficult decisions 
under uncertainty. Thus, transnational links to other crises – in the form of the similarity of 
conflict characteristics – help to explain the likelihood of mediation in crises ‘at home.’  
There is, in fact, anecdotal evidence for mediation diffusion: according to Sørbø et al. 
(2011), Norway’s previous mediation interventions in the Middle East, creating the image of 
a ‘global peace broker,’ made Sri Lankan President Chandrika Kumaratunga requesting 
mediation from Norway in her country as well. Evidently, this is only a selected illustration 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 The data I employ focus on crises, which are defined according to three criteria (Brecher & Wilkenfeld, 2010: 
12): there must be a threat to a state’s basic values, there is a heightened risk of military action, and there is only 
a finite time horizon in which a state can respond. I use the terms ‘crisis,’ ‘dispute,’ and ‘conflict’ 
interchangeably. Finally, Bercovitch, Anagnoson & Wille (1991: 8) define mediation as ‘a process of conflict 
management where disputants seek the assistance of, or accept an offer of help from, an individual, group, state, 
or organization to settle their conflict or resolve their differences without resorting to physical force or invoking 
the authority of the law.’ 
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and limited to the same mediator across different crises. But is there systematic evidence that 
mediation diffuses from one crisis to another – even if the relevant actors (belligerents and 
the (potential) mediator) are not the same? 
While earlier work (Böhmelt, 2015) focuses on the geographical proximity between crises 
and finds that mediation travels across conflicts if they occurred in the same region, it 
remains unclear which specific channels are responsible for this diffusion. That is, geographic 
proximity is not conditioned on some factor, but merely interpreted as capturing common 
security dynamics, regional security issues, or norms of conflict resolution. Put differently, 
geographically contiguous crises are disproportionately influenced by the same dynamics 
(Kathman, 2010; 2011). This mirrors Crescenzi et al. (2011) who demonstrate that distance is 
associated with the occurrence of conflict management. Hence, the geographic clustering of 
international mediation strongly suggests that its likelihood in one conflict is not only 
determined by factors of that individual conflict (i.e., unit-specific effects pertaining to the 
crisis in question), but that other, neighboring crises also influence the likelihood of whether 
we see mediation or not, i.e., there are trans-crisis influences (see also Buhaug & Gleditsch, 
2008). However, ‘space is more than geography’ (Beck, Gleditsch & Beardsley, 2006) and 
the actual mechanisms at work for the within-region diffusion of mediation are less well 
understood (Buhaug & Gleditsch, 2008). 
In order to shed light on this, I focus on conflict characteristics – one of the most critical 
dimensions of crises (Bercovitch & Langley, 1993; Bercovitch & Houston, 2000; Kathman, 
2010; 2011) – and argue that a ‘common nature of the dispute’ constitutes a link between 
crises that, in turn, motivates the diffusion of mediation. Building on the claim that mediation 
is driven by demand and supply (Beardsley & Greig, 2009), I contend that the all actors 
involved are likely to employ the heuristic of learning from and emulating structurally 
similar conflicts. Leaders constantly face difficult decisions under uncertainty and, hence, 
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they tend to use ‘cognitive shortcuts’ by comparing their circumstances and policies with 
others (Kahneman et al., 1982). These shortcuts are essentially heuristics – guidelines for 
action that should lead to reasonable results (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Gale & Kariv, 
2003). I suggest that one such a heuristic could be based on the similarity of characteristics 
across crises. We know, for instance, that particularly the more difficult, i.e., more violent 
and salient disputes attract mediation (Gartner & Bercovitch, 2006). While this is a domestic 
or unit-level factor, common levels of violence or issue salience constitute a trans-crisis 
informational tie between conflicts that may be linked to a learning and emulation process of 
the relevant actors. That is, if two conflicts have, e.g., a similar level of violence (even at 
equally low levels) and one has seen mediation before, actors in the other conflict might 
observe, learn from, and emulate this. The outcome is in turn that they believe that a 
comparable approach of third-party mediation could be suitable in that second crisis as well. 
Ultimately, this article advances the argument that mediation diffuses due learning from and 
emulating those conflicts, which are linked via the ties of common conflict characteristics – 
even if the relevant actors are not the same across crises. 
The findings are robust across different model specifications, estimation techniques, and 
while controlling for a number of ‘exogenous-external conditions or common shocks and 
spatially correlated unit level factors’ (Franzese & Hays, 2007: 142), which ensure to rule out 
the possibility that what appears to be mediation diffusion across crises is the result of 
common exposure or clustering. I contribute to the study of networked international politics 
as, on one hand, my theoretical argument is based on the rationale that specific units (crises) 
do not exist in isolation from each other, but – depending on some degree of connectedness 
(links) – may very much be interdependent. This addresses a core concept of network 
analysis: ‘complex interdependence’ (see Hoff & Ward, 2004; Dorff & Ward, 2013). On the 
other hand, I elaborate on the relationship between spatial econometrics and network analysis 
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with my focus on the broader diffusion literature: while there is anecdotal evidence that 
mediation travels from one crisis to another, my study is the first to provide systematic 
evidence relying on spatial econometrics empirically and, theoretically, arguments based on 
network analysis and diffusion. In fact, like network analysis, spatial econometrics allows me 
to ‘account for extra-dyadic relations’ among crises (Dorussen, Gartzke & Westerwinter, 
2016). The implication of my work is that an important mechanism for conflict resolution ‘at 
home’ is emulation and learning by the relevant actors with a view to address their dispute 
more effectively. The conclusion that conflict actors respond to other conflicts introduces 
another very important external factor for our understanding of how mediation evolves; 
namely, crises, and all actors therein, are influenced by other crises’ conflict characteristics 
and mediation. This finding also contributes to the vast literature on mediation that has 
largely focused on purely ‘domestic’ or unit-level influences so far. 
Second, while earlier work (Böhmelt, 2015) demonstrates that mediation diffuses, the 
underlying mechanism for this has not been identified. This article offers a more nuanced 
perspective, allowing us both theoretically and empirically to unpack this ‘black box’ and to 
shed more light on which ties between conflicts actually motivate the supply and demand 
sides to learn and emulate. Eventually, when controlling for domestic-level influences and the 
effect of common exposure, I can demonstrate that common conflict characteristics matter 
even across different estimation strategies, but it is only a mutual level of violence that drives 
the findings. I do not find evidence for other joint characteristics such as ethnic conflicts, 
salience, or protracted disputes and, hence, they are unrelated to mediation diffusion. 
Third, I also consider the likelihood that actors are more willing and likely to learn from 
previous successes, i.e., effective mediation attempts in other conflicts. While I discuss a 
series of arguments for and against this claim, the results show that outcomes of previous 
mediations in other conflicts hardly influence the learning and emulation of the actors in 
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another conflict. Put differently, mediation does diffuse via the channel of common levels of 
violence, but this largely occurs independently from the rate of success in other interventions. 
 
Literature: The diffusion of mediation within and across disputes 
The determinants of mediation in both interstate and civil conflicts have been widely 
studied.3 One core finding states that prior mediation in a particular dispute motivates further 
mediations. The belligerents (demand side) and the (potential) mediator (supply side) learn 
that mediation, even if it was ineffective before in resolving the dispute completely, could 
help addressing the underlying issues of contention. Hence, these actors rely on mediation 
again (e.g., Regan and Stam, 2000). For instance, Bercovitch & Houston (2000: 183) 
highlight that ‘the feedback from previous events includes information, experience, learning, 
and understanding gained by the mediator and the parties.’ Melin (2011: 698) emphasizes 
that mediation attempts ‘are not independent, with subsequent efforts at least commencing 
with more information than was available at the previous one’ (see also Greig & Regan, 
2008: 765).  
The mechanisms leading to this ‘diffusion of mediation’ over the course of one dispute are 
primarily related to what the general diffusion literature coined ‘learning’ and ‘emulation’ 
(e.g., Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000; Elkins & Simmons, 2005; Gilardi, 2012). Specifically, 
mediation and the outcome of the process are characterized by uncertainty (e.g., Beardsley, 
2008; 2011). Parties might then rely on their own experience (belligerents) or the experience 
of others (e.g., other, previous mediators) to ‘estimate the likely consequences of policy 
[mediation],’ i.e., learning (Gilardi, 2012: 463). Alternatively, according to emulation, in 
situations of uncertainty, actors simply pursue those policies that have been implemented 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 See Wallensteen & Svensson (2014) for an excellent literature review. 
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before by themselves or others due to their (policies’) ‘normative and socially constructed 
properties’ (Gilardi, 2012: 466f).4 	  
However, while the general literature suggests that policies – or, as in this case, mediation 
– can diffuse across units (crises), most of the existing mediation literature only focuses on 
different mediation attempts over the course of one dispute. I previously sought to extend this 
perspective by arguing that learning and emulation occur, and, ultimately, mediation diffuses 
across different crises that may not even have the same mediators or belligerents (Böhmelt, 
2015). According to spatial contagion effects, mediation in one conflict is not only 
determined by factors of an individual crisis, but regional influences. These regional 
influences are empirically captured by geographical proximity and I suspected that this joint 
regional membership pertains to a similar security culture, regional dynamics, and norms. 
There is thus evidence that mediation diffuses within and across crises, but our knowledge 
about the latter remains limited. Theoretically, it is merely assumed that geographical 
proximity captures common cultural norms, regional security dynamics, and norms. This 
assumption could be too strong, though. For example, both the UK and Greece belong to the 
same geographical region of Europe, but their respective crises, e.g., the Cod Wars between 
the UK and Iceland on one hand and, on the other hand, the various crises between Greece 
and Turkey, may have very few ‘dynamics’ or ‘norms’ in common. Empirically, only 
focusing on geographical proximity neither allows us to identify the actual channel of 
diffusion nor does it provide much control for what Buhaug & Gleditsch (2008: 216) call the 
‘reverse Galton’s problem:’ earlier findings of mediation diffusion ‘could be simply due to a 
corresponding distribution of relevant state [domestic or unit/crisis-specific] characteristics’ 
(Buhaug & Gleditsch, 2008: 216) that are correlated with mediation. This, nonetheless, is 
hardly related to a deliberate and genuine process of mediation diffusion. As Buhaug & 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




Gleditsch (2008: 216) conclude, ‘we would face a reverse Galton’s problem if we try to 
evaluate evidence for spatial contagion without first considering relevant unit attributes that 
may be both spatially clustered and potentially related’ (emphasis added) to mediation onset. 
I therefore seek to offer a more accurate and disaggregated perspective both theoretically 
and empirically. I first develop a theoretical argument for why we might observe mediation 
diffusion across regionally proximate crises that are linked to each other via similar conflict 
characteristics. While controlling for domestic-level influences, taking into account the effect 
of common exposure, and using different estimation strategies, I then empirically test the 
theoretical expectations by examining common conflict-characteristic linkages between crises 
in 1918-2007 and how they affect the likelihood of mediation.   
 
The diffusion of mediation via common conflict characteristics 
In one of the first steps toward identifying the specific channels of diffusion that might allow 
mediation travelling from one dispute to another, I focus on common conflict characteristics. 
The nature of a conflict, e.g., the level of violence, salience, or intensity, is one of the major 
determinants of mediation both from a supply and demand perspective (e.g., Beardsley & 
Greig, 2009; Bercovitch & Houston, 2000; Bercovitch & Langley, 1993). The more difficult 
a conflict is (or becomes), the more likely that the belligerents realize that they are simply not 
able to solve a conflict on their own, but need help from outside (Regan & Stam, 2000; Greig, 
2005; Melin, 2015). From a supply side, the more intense, violent, or salient a specific crisis, 
the more likely it is that its negative externalities harm other nations not only in the same 
region, but globally (see also Buhaug & Gleditsch, 2008; Kathman, 2010; 2011). This also 
increases the chances of mediation. However, while those arguments can predict why some 
belligerents ask for mediation or some mediators offer to intervene due to the characteristics 
of one specific crisis, it is less clear why or how these conflict features work as trans-crisis 
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influences leading to the diffusion of mediation.  
The belligerents and the potential mediator face uncertainty in the conflict process (e.g., 
Beardsley, 2008; 2011). It is thus difficult to assess whether mediation should be pursued, 
since it might be suitable in one situation, but less so in another (Melin, 2015).5 To cope with 
this uncertainty and to decide whether mediation is the ‘right tool’ in a specific context, I 
argue the demand and supply-side actors are likely to rely on ‘cognitive shortcuts’ by 
comparing their circumstances with other, similar ones (see Kahneman, Slovic & Tversky, 
1982; Tversky & Kahneman, 1982): the antagonists and the potential mediator in a crisis 
employ the heuristic of learning from and emulating the mediation behavior in other, similar 
crises abroad. Consequently, similarity in conflict characteristics serves as an available 
precedent for the actors in another crisis.  
Weyland (2005), in fact, claims that diffusion under uncertainty is guided by the use of 
cognitive heuristics, and emulating and learning from similar units may be ‘one of the 
simplest and most effective cognitive heuristics in the calculation of utilities’ (Elkins & 
Simmons, 2005: 45). Kahneman and Frederick (2002: 53) define heuristics as ‘judgment is 
modified by a heuristic when an individual assesses a specified target attribute of judgment 
by substituting another property of that object – the heuristic attribute – which comes more 
readily to mind.’ I contend that the similarity of another crisis context could eventually ‘come 
to mind,’ particularly as they are observable. Therefore, conflict actors relying on whether a 
foreign, similar crisis had seen mediation to judge whether this could also be an option ‘at 
home’ employ a heuristic.  
According to Tversky & Kahneman (1982: 164), ‘a person is said to employ the 
availability heuristic whenever he estimates frequency or probability by the ease with which 
instances or associations can be brought to mind.’ That is, suppose the conflict actors try to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 In light of this, I assume that the actors involved have the ‘sincere’ motive to end a conflict. I examine this 
assumption thoroughly in the appendix.  
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assess the probability with which mediation might be suitable for their context as well. If they 
use the availability heuristic, this probability will increase with the number of instances they 
can recall when other, similar crises before adopted mediation. To answer the broader 
question of how likely it is to belong to the set of ‘similar conflicts,’ conflict actors might 
then rely on the representativeness heuristic ‘in which the probabilities are evaluated by the 
degree to which A resembles B’ (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974: 1124) – here, this is the extent 
to which the focal conflict resembles another dispute. Aspects that matter include visible or 
observable characteristics – and most conflict characteristics qualify for that. 
In fact, the use of heuristics has long been a subsidiary theme in the literature. For 
example, Leng & Regan (2003: 436) suggest that belligerents and the (potential) mediator use 
a similar culture as a heuristic for fewer coordination costs between them that should make 
both mediation and an effective outcome more likely (Bakaki, Böhmelt & Bove, 2015). 
Simmons & Elkins (2004: 176) similarly state that ‘[t]he policies of culturally similar 
countries are perceived to (and in fact may) contain highly relevant information on the 
appropriateness of a particular policy in a specific context of shared values.’ Hence, if two 
conflicts share the same conflict characteristics, a heuristic, i.e., a link is given that facilitates 
the flow of information between the disputes – and, eventually learning or emulation by the 
relevant actors. Following Regan & Stam (2000: 244), the heuristic of learning from and 
emulating the mediation behavior in similar conflicts ‘increases the knowledge that the 
parties hold regarding their own and their adversaries’ positions, potential compromises, and 
the costs of continued conflict.’ A common set of conflict characteristics then signals to the 
actors of a ‘new’ conflict that mediation is a suitable tool for addressing the underlying 
grievances – if mediation has been used before. In other words, disputants and (potential) 
mediators are responsive to conflict characteristics, yet not only with regard to ‘their own’ 
conflict (see Greig, 2015), but also across different crises.	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It is likely, though, that primarily visible/observable characteristics qualify as learning and 
emulation heuristics, which induce the convergence to the same outcome, i.e., mediation if a 
previous crisis has experienced this. Conflict characteristics per se are a major and potentially 
very visible determinant of mediation (Beardsley & Greig, 2009; Bercovitch & Houston, 
2000). Bercovitch & Langley (1993: 675) emphasize accordingly that ‘[i]t seems a truism to 
suggest that the nature of a dispute will have a significant impact on the success or failure of 
a mediation attempt. […] Similarly, Ott (1972) argues that “the success or failure of 
mediation is largely determined by the nature of the dispute, with the characteristics and 
tactics of the mediator marginal at best” (p. 597).’ Subscribing to these claims that common 
conflict characteristics are visible, salient heuristics, learning and emulation make demand 
and supply-side actors perceive that if mediation has been employed before, it is also suitable 
to their context and could work in the ‘new,’ current crisis.  
 
H1: Demand and supply for mediation in one crisis i respond to the mediation behavior of 
a previous crisis j if both crises are connected via the link of common conflict characteristics. 
 
The diffusion of effective mediation via common conflict characteristics 
Kahneman & Frederick (2002) also emphasize that using heuristics can induce poor decision-
making as relevant information is ignored. Thus, learning from and emulating other crises 
that are ‘simply’ similar in their characteristics could lead to misleading strategies. This 
argument suggests that conflict parties are likely to consider contextual, conditioning factors 
as well when using information on other, similar crises. A number of conditioning factors 
may apply, but I focus on the degree of effectiveness of previous mediation attempts in 
similar crises abroad. 
Actors of one dispute perhaps only learn from and emulate previous, successful mediations 
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in other similar disputes, and thus pursue mediation in their comparable context only when 
this success criterion is met. For instance, why should conflict actors perceive mediation as a 
potentially effective conflict-resolution tool if it failed to bring peace in other instances? 
However, the previous literature has not (yet) reached consensus on whether actors are more 
likely to learn from success or failure. By implication, it is unclear whether it is successful 
mediations that effectively end a conflict or unsuccessful ones where a mediation attempt is 
not able to induce peace, which influence the likelihood of mediation in the focal crisis. In 
fact, there are arguments that actors are likely to learn from both mediation success and 
failure (see, e.g., Bercovitch & Houston, 2000; Greig, 2005; Greig & Regan, 2008; Melin, 
2011). 
On one hand, some scholars (e.g., Bennett, 1991; Lee & Strang, 2003; Gilardi, 2012: 466) 
contend it is primarily success that matters for learning and emulation processes. That is, only 
if mediation was effective in one crisis, the actors in another crisis will perceive this as 
crucial, which then works as a heuristic and forms a link that facilitates learning and 
emulation. On the other hand, recent research from the literature on cognitive heuristics also 
considers how ‘positive or negative’ experiences can influence learning and emulation (e.g., 
McDermott et al., 2008). In this literature, negative experiences, which mirror ineffective 
mediation in my context where the mediator is unable to bring peace to a conflict, could have 
a stronger cognitive effect than a positive experience, i.e., peace is created as mediation was 
successful (see Baumeister et al., 2001). For example, Khong (1992) focuses on leaders’ 
decision making and their heuristics in light of other, similar actors’ actions. It is found that it 
is basically negative factors that tend to have a stronger impact on learning and emulation, 
and, in turn, decision-making.  
In light of these opposing arguments and findings, it follows that, in addition to the 
relevant informational challenge to process information of failed vs. successful mediation 
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attempts (Kebschull, 1994), actors may not be able to disentangle the diffusion effects 
stemming from outcomes, but they elaborate their decisions in more general terms of 
mediation occurrence in other crises, i.e., what I claim in my first hypothesis (see also 
McDermott 1998). The following hypothesis on the possible direction of learning and 
emulation based on effective mediations then follows the first line of argumentation, although 
I note that the use of heuristics via learning and emulation may well work for previously 
failed mediations, too (see Khong, 1992), or is unrelated to the success criterion altogether 
(see Kebschull, 1994).   
 
H2: Demand and supply for mediation in one crisis i only respond to effective mediation of 
a previous crisis j if both crises are connected via the link of common conflict characteristics. 
 
Research design 
Data and dependent variable 
I rely on the cross-sectional data from the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) project 
(Brecher & Wilkenfeld, 2010; see also Wilkenfeld et al., 2003) to empirically test my 
hypotheses. In the most recent (10th) release, these data consist of 455 crises between 1918 
and 2007, while a crisis is defined according to the criteria in Footnote 1. I use the ICB’s 
system-level data and, hence, the unit of analysis is an individual crisis.6  
The dependent variable is mediation onset, which is operationalized via the ICB’s 
MEDIATE item coding whether a crisis has seen at least one mediation attempt between its 
onset and termination (1) or not (0). For defining mediation, the ICB project follows 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Therefore, the sample also includes cases in which mediation did not occur. This, and the fact that the data are 
not limited to cases that become militarized at some point, circumvents the issue of selection bias to a great 
extent (Gartner & Bercovitch, 2006). 
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Bercovitch, Anagnoson & Wille (1991: 8) as outlined in Footnote 1.7 According to the data, 
141 (31 percent) of all 455 crises have seen at least one mediation attempt over their course.8  
 
Explanatory variables 
In order to capture spatial dependencies as my core explanatory variables, (Franzese & Hays, 
2007; Beck, Gleditsch & Beardsley, 2006), I rely on several specifications of Wy, which 
stands for the product of a row-standardized connectivity matrix (W) and the observed values 
of the dependent variable (y).9 Due to the cross-sectional nature of my data, the connectivity 
matrix is defined as a NxN matrix with an element wi,j capturing the relative connectivity of 
unit (crisis) j to unit (crisis) i. The spatial lag then gives a weighted average of other 
observations, with each weight specified by wi,j, while the spatial coefficient of Wy, ρ, 
captures the strength of interdependence. 
Calculating a spatial lag for cross-section data via a symmetric NxN matrix induces 
simultaneity, however, i.e., every unit i is influenced by every unit j and vice versa, which, in 
turn, means that the spatial lag is endogenous (Franzese & Hays, 2007). Accordingly, in order 
to ensure that the spatial impact of a crisis is directional and not reversible, I consider only 
those crises as being potentially able to influence a specific dispute if they occurred before a 
conflict in question, i.e., the spatial lags’ values do not give a weighted average of all other 
crises from 1918 to 2007, but only from those in previous years. This approach mirrors using 
an asymmetric, i.e., directed, connectivity matrix.  
Following my theoretical rationale, I measure the links between two crises via their degree 
of similarity in dispute characteristics while all these links are additionally weighted by 
geographical proximity. The latter requirement induces that the values of the connectivity 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 I outline the exact coding descriptions in the appendix. 
8 Due to missing values, the sample used for the analysis comprises 449 crises. 
9 I return to the issue of row standardization in the appendix. 
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matrices for the four spatial lags introduced below automatically receive a value of 0 if two 
crises did not occur in the same region – independent from whether they have conflict 
characteristics in common or not. The data for geographical proximity are taken from the 
ICB’s variable on the five regions of dispute origin: Africa, Americas, Asia, Europe, and the 
Middle East.10 This approach ensures that my results are comparable to Böhmelt (2015), but 
also extends the latter as I consider conflict characteristics, i.e., we are able to identify the 
underlying mechanism for the actual association between crises’ geographical proximity and 
mediation diffusion. As a result, with this weighting procedure, we can identify the genuine 
diffusion channels from an intra-regional perspective (for the same approach, see also 
Buhaug & Gleditsch, 2008).11 
I focus on four key conflict characteristics, which leads to four different spatial lags 
pertaining to H1: ethnicity, protracted conflicts, geostrategic salience, and violence. First, 
ethnopolitical and identity-based disputes are more difficult to settle and agreements are less 
likely to be stable in a fractionalized environment with competing ethnic groups (e.g., 
Kaufmann, 1996). The ICB data provide the dichotomous ETHNIC item (Brecher & 
Wilkenfeld, 2010: 57), which I used to construct a spatial lag based on a connectivity matrix 
in which each element wi,j measures whether dispute i and dispute j occurred in the same 
region and have an ethnic component in common (1) or not (0). As a result, non-ethnic 
conflicts, independent of whether they occurred in the same region (and independent of 
whether the first crisis was mediated), receive zeros in the weighted matrix. Since I require 
asymmetric matrices (explained above), I also replaced all wi,j values of 1 with 0 if a potential 
source crisis j broke out after or in the same year as the target crisis i. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 The ICB data do not contain precise information on the country or exact geographical location a dispute took 
place in (Brecher & Wilkenfeld, 2010: 53). Therefore, taking, e.g., land-based contiguity of disputes or between 
the belligerents is prevented by the lack of coding. 
11 This approach is also based on Kathman’s (2011) argument that instabilities are more common in specific 
regions, which may then affect the use of heuristics. 
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Second, protracted conflicts are ‘situations of extended duration, fluctuating interactions, 
spillovers of hostility into all aspects of relations, strong forces tending to restore equilibrium, 
and characterized by indefinite continuation’ (Brecher & Wilkenfeld, 2010: 55). For example, 
there was a protracted conflict in the former Yugoslavia between 1991 and 1999 according to 
the ICB. This conflict comprised three individual crises: Yugoslavia I (Croatia-Slovenia 
1991; ICB ID 397), Yugoslavia II (Bosnia 1992; ICB ID 403), and Kosovo (1999; ICB ID 
430). While all these crises are coded as separate cases in the data, they are in fact very much 
related to and not independent from each other: they belong to a protracted conflict. Thereby, 
the protracted conflict item also captures recurring conflicts, i.e., crises that are related to 
some earlier hostility between the same actors.  
While it is thus not only crucial to capture these dependencies between crises from an 
empirical perspective (as, in fact, the belligerents do hardly vary across these crises and, 
hence, mediation might diffuse more easily), Gartner & Bercovitch (2006) or Bercovitch, 
Anagnoson & Wille (1991) theoretically contend that protracted disputes are also more likely 
to see mediation. These tough cases pose a more severe threat to the belligerents and the 
international environment – including prospective mediators. This argument can be extended 
to the level of violence.12 The more violent a dispute, the higher the likelihood that the 
belligerents’ attitudes are hardened and the conflict cycle has escalated (Bercovitch & 
Langley, 1993: 676). 
Against this background, I consider two additional spatial lags. On one hand, I constructed 
a spatial lag based on a connectivity matrix in which each element wi,j measures whether 
dispute i and dispute j occurred in the same region and belong to an underlying protracted 
conflict (1) or not (0). Consequently, non-protracted conflicts, independent of whether they 
occurred in the same region or not (and independent of whether the first crisis was mediated) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Given that these two spatial-lag variables are meant to capture similar influences, it may be the case that they 
are highly correlated with each other. However, m-STAR models (Hays, Kachi & Franzese, 2010), which 
control for this possibility (Table I), do not question the substance of the other models. 
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receive 0s in the weighted matrix for this spatial lag. Again, I replaced all wi,j values of 1 with 
0 if a potential source crisis broke j out after or in the same year as the target crisis i. On the 
other hand, the ICB contains the variable VIOL capturing the intensity of a crisis on an 
ordinal scale: (1) no violence, (2) minor clashes, (3) serious clashes, and (4) full-scale wars. 
In order to operationalize a link between dispute i and dispute j, I calculated the absolute 
difference13 in violence-level distances between i and j and rescaled this so that higher values 
signify lower distances (i.e., a higher degree of similarity in the level of violence) for the 
values of wi,j. If a potential source crisis j broke out after or in the same year as the target 
crisis i, and in the absence of a common regional tie between these crises, wi,j takes the value 
of 0 (i.e., no link between two crises in the connectivity matrix).  
While conflict characteristics are particularly visible determinants of mediation, given the 
literature’s emphasis on third parties’ preferences for ceasing the hostilities (Balch-Lindsay 
& Enterline, 2000; Regan, 2002; Kathman, 2011), I expect particularly crises’ links via the 
level of violence to be important. Thus, the level of violence may be the most visible, salient, 
and evident issue when it comes to mediation both from a supply and demand perspective. 
With regard to the supply side, Kathman (2011: 852) states that ‘foremost, third parties may 
attempt to cease the hostilities. A number of studies argue this to be the primary goal of 
intervention, noting that while third parties may have a variety of political goals in 
intervention, none can be achieved without first ending the violence.’ In terms of the demand 
side, Balch-Lindsay & Enterline (2000: 623) observe that the costs pertaining to the violence 
of a crisis ‘on the participants have a strong influence on the dynamics’ of conflict.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Calculating the absolute difference for the ICB’s VIOL and GEOSTR (fourth spatial lag) items assumes that 
the differences between specific values of these variables have the same meaning. This is not necessarily true 
for ordinally scaled variables such as VIOL and GEOSTR, however. I thus calculated alternative links between 
crises for VIOL and GEOSTR that are based on Gower’s similarity measure: 𝑆!"# = 1 − !!"!!!"!!  . Here, 𝑥!" 




Finally, the GEOSTR variable from the ICB data refers to the salience of an international 
crisis as measured by the number of international systems the dispute affects (Brecher & 
Wilkenfeld, 2010: 47). Originally, this variable takes the values of 1 (only one subsystem is 
affected) to 5 (the global system is affected by a crisis). Similar to the spatial lag based on 
violence, I take the absolute difference in levels of geostrategic salience between i and j, and 
rescaled this variable so that higher values signify lower dissimilarities in salience for the 
values of wi,j. Again, if a potential source crisis j broke out after or in the same year as the 
target crisis i, and in the absence of a common regional tie between these crises, wi,j takes the 
value of 0 (i.e., no link between two crises in the connectivity matrix). 
In light of the discussion on effectiveness leading to my second hypothesis, I also 
constructed a second set of spatial lags for H2 that are based on the connectivity matrices 
described above, but are not multiplied with y (i.e., my dependent variable, mediation onset). 
Instead, the underlying connectivity matrices are multiplied with a new variable, which 
captures only previous successful mediation attempts as coded by the ICB data’s item 
MEDEFCT (Brecher & Wilkenfeld, 2010: 67). 
Since all spatial lags represent a weighted average of all other observations (excluding a 
respective dispute under study), with each weight specified in spatial terms, while the spatial 
coefficient ρ captures the strength of interdependence, I expect a positive spatial coefficient ρ 
for all these variables as higher values pertain to stronger interlinkages according to joint 
conflict characteristics between regional disputes. A positive and statistically significant 
spatial coefficient ρ would constitute evidence for mediation diffusion. 
 
Control variables 
Mediation is unlikely to be exclusively driven by trans-crises interdependencies. Moreover, 
when examining a spatial contagion effect, we also have to account for other factors, 
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particularly unit/crisis-specific or monadic factors that may be ‘both spatially clustered and 
potentially related to conflict’ (Buhaug & Gleditsch, 2008: 216). Put differently, the spatial 
clustering of mediation we might observe could simply be driven by a corresponding 
distribution of relevant conflict (domestic) characteristics associated with that conflict. This 
‘reverse Galton’s problem’ (Buhaug & Gleditsch, 2008: 12) has to be addressed by 
considering relevant unit attributes that are both spatially clustered and potentially related to 
the outcome. I control for such relevant alternative influences, i.e. ‘exogenous-external 
conditions or common shocks and spatially correlated unit level factors’ (Franzese & Hays, 
2007: 142), which are located at the ‘domestic’ level of conflicts (see Wallensteen & 
Svensson, 2014). These control variables pertain to the demand and supply side of mediation, 
e.g., the unit-level level of violence may not only influence the antagonists’ demand for 
mediation, but also affect a potential mediator’s cost-benefit analysis of intervention. 
Considering these controls ensures that mediation contagion ‘cannot be dismissed as a mere 
product of a clustering in similar [dispute] characteristics’ (Buhaug & Gleditsch, 2008: 230). 
First, coming to the characteristics of the disputants, democracies might share the norm of 
peaceful conflict resolution. This should make democratic belligerents more likely to agree to 
mediation (e.g., Raymond, 1994).14 By using the dichotomous democracy measure from the 
ICB, I constructed a joint-democracy specification, i.e., this variable only receives the value 
of 1 if all disputants involved in a specific crisis are democracies (0 otherwise). 
Second, antagonists that approximate military parity, i.e., neither side has a clear military 
advantage, are generally more likely to agree on mediation (Mason & Fett, 1996: 550; Greig, 
2005: 258). I employ the ICB’s POWDISSY variable (Brecher & Wilkenfeld, 2010: 57), 
which refers to the capability gap between adversaries in an international crisis. The extent of 
power or capability discrepancy in a crisis ranges from none, when all adversaries are at the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 For counterarguments, however, see, e.g., Ellis, Mitchell & Prins (2010). 
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same level of capability, to maximal discrepancy, e.g., when the main adversaries are a 
superpower and a small power. I take the natural logarithm to account for its skewed 
distribution and I expect this item to be negatively related to mediation onset. 
Third, there is Duration, i.e., a variable that measures the time elapsed from the start of a 
crisis until its end. Including a duration item also corrects for possible temporal dependencies 
and selection effects (see Regan & Stam, 2000). I introduce a log-transformed version of this 
variable. Fourth, following Franzese & Hays (2007: 142) who suggest incorporating 
‘spatially correlated unit-level factors,’ the conflict characteristics I used for the construction 
of the spatial lags are also introduced as domestic/unit-level (monadic) controls. 
Finally, to further rule out the possibility of common exposure, i.e., spatial clustering that 
is not driven by crises’ interdependence, I also include time-period dummies for the post-
World War I period (1919-1938), World War II (1939-1945), the Cold War (1946-1990), and 
the post-Cold War period (1991-2007). These dummies capture system-wide changes in 
technology or international institutions, and, more generally, ‘exogenous-external conditions 
or shocks’ that are common for all crises in a given period (Franzese & Hays, 2007: 142; 
2008).15  
Against this background, obtaining significant estimates for the one of the spatial lags’ 
coefficients while including all these controls substantially increases the confidence in the 
existence of a true mediation diffusion effect between crises. 
 
Empirical findings 
Using probit regressions as the main models, Model 1 (Table I) presents the results of the 
basic model, i.e., the spatial lags that are based on mediation efforts in other conflicts, but not 
outcomes. Model 2 then introduces the ‘effectiveness-based’ spatial lags instead of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 The appendix summarizes the descriptive statistics of the variables discussed in this section. As demonstrated 
there, all variables are characterized by a sufficient amount of variance across crises. 
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regular ones. I report coefficients and robust standard errors that address potential problems 
with heteroskedasticity. I also present substantive quantities of interest for the spatial lags in 
the form of simulated first differences. Here, I define a first difference as the change in the 
probability that Mediation=1 induced by an increase from the 25th to the 75th percentile of a 
variable in question while holding all other covariates at their median. Finally, I also present 
results for multiparametric spatiotemporal autoregressive (m-STAR) models (Hays, Kachi & 
Franzese, 2010) in Models 3 and 4. The m-STAR model explicitly allows for a simultaneous 
inclusion of all spatial lags, while controlling for the case where connectivity, i.e., the 
selection into a network, might be endogenous to the dependent variable.16 
Starting with interpreting the spatial lags, three of the four exert an insignificant impact on 
mediation onset. Moreover, the impact direction of WEthnic and WSalience is actually negative. 
These findings are mirrored by the first differences presented in Figure 1. These results 
hardly support my expectations – mediation does apparently not diffuse through channels of 
common conflict characteristics. However, WViolence exerts a positive effect that is statistically 
significant at the 5 percent level (Model 1). In substantive terms, Figure 1 shows that when 
moving from the 25th to the 75th percentile of WViolence, the predicted probability of a crisis to 
see mediation increases by about 15 percentage points. The m-STAR regression (Model 3) 
supports this finding: mediation diffuses between conflicts that are (a) located in the same 
region and (b) similar in terms of the level of violence. Hence, at least in terms of WViolence, I 
do obtain empirical support for a genuine mediation diffusion effect. 
Interestingly, Models 2 and 4 offer little support for the claim that the actors are more 
likely to learn from and emulate previous effective mediations. All spatial lags are statistically 
insignificant and even WViolence does no longer reach conventional levels of significance. This 
finding is robust across the different estimation strategies in Models 2 and 4, while adding or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 The m-STAR model is a linear model. Hence, Models 3 and 4 basically depict the results of a linear 
probability model, which suffers from built-in heteroskedasticity. However, as the substantive results do not 
differ across estimation strategies, the concerns over a bias due to this are lowered. 
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dropping any of the controls does not affect this either. In other words, particularly in light of 
the results in Models 1 and 3, the supply and demand actors in a crisis do learn from and 
emulate all types of previous mediations. The outcome as such of these previous third-party 
interventions in other conflicts does not matter much, though. 
 
Table I. The diffusion of international mediation via conflict characteristics 












WEthnic  –0.627  –0.262  –0.164  –0.034 
  (0.467)  (0.491)  (0.150)  (0.161) 
WProtracted   0.519   0.224   0.161   0.047 
  (0.683)  (0.776)  (0.201)  (0.236) 
WViolence   4.257   2.440   1.520   1.133 
  (2.123)*  (2.484)  (0.596)*  (0.708) 
WSalience  –3.012  –0.734  –1.217  –0.613 
  (2.184)  (2.584)  (0.609)*  (0.730) 
Democracy   0.295   0.246   0.089   0.076 
  (0.178)†  (0.183)  (0.053)†  (0.053) 
Power asymmetry (ln) –0.075 –0.071 –0.025 –0.023 
  (0.063)  (0.063)  (0.018)  (0.018) 
Protracted conflict –0.037   0.011 –0.011   0.007 
  (0.158)  (0.141)  (0.046)  (0.042) 
Geostrategic salience –0.244 –0.220 –0.069 –0.063 
  (0.089)**  (0.089)*  (0.022)**  (0.023)** 
Ethnic crisis   0.553   0.439   0.165   0.133 
  (0.238)*  (0.202)*  (0.074)*  (0.062)* 
Duration (ln)   0.625   0.627   0.207   0.208 
  (0.221)**  (0.225)**  (0.049)**  (0.049)** 
Violence   0.246   0.280   0.068   0.077 
  (0.076)**  (0.078)**  (0.021)**  (0.021)** 
Period I –0.587 –0.622 –0.200 –0.201 
  (0.289)*  (0.273)*  (0.085)*  (0.081)* 
Period II –1.557 –1.520 –0.284 –0.282 
  (0.399)**  (0.368)**  (0.102)**  (0.099)** 
Period III –0.449 –0.421 –0.146 –0.135 
  (0.217)*  (0.215)*  (0.065)*  (0.065)* 
Constant –0.749 –0.925   0.292   0.214 
  (0.407)†  (0.401)*  (0.122)*  (0.116)† 
Observations 449 449 449 449 
Log pseudo likelihood –229.961 –229.691 –244.190 –243.434 
Wald χ2 84.90*** 91.83*** 75.35*** 78.42*** 
 
† significant at 10 percent; * significant at 5 percent; ** significant at 1 percent (two-tailed). Standard errors in 











The results for my core variables lead to the following conclusions that link my empirical 
results to the theoretical framework. First, mediation does diffuse from one crisis to another, 
but this is primarily done via the channel of similar levels of violence. Hence, my theoretical 
argument applies and there is support for H1 – but only under certain conditions. A common 
ethnic component, geostrategic salience, or protracted conflicts matter less and there is hardly 





















Figure 1. First differences 
 
Graph based on Models 1-2. Horizontal bars pertain to 95 percent confidence intervals. First difference of 0 marked with 
vertical line. All variables except focal variable are held at their median value. 
 
Second, what makes violence ‘special’ given the results suggesting that the heuristic of 
learning from and emulating the mediation behavior in other crises only works for a common 
level of violence? In general, conflict characteristics are a particularly salient and visible set 
of mediation determinants (Bercovitch & Langley, 1993). However, according to Bercovitch 
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& Langley (1993) and various other sources cited above, it is particularly violence that 
matters. And, in fact, factors like the issue dimension (ethnic component, salience) or the 
complexity of a conflict (protracted crisis) all influence the level of violence of a conflict – 
but it is unlikely that this applies the other way round (Bercovitch & Langley, 1993: 687). 
Hence, violence is the most observable and salient factor of the set of conflict characteristics 
that, in turn, facilitates learning and emulation precisely because of its high visibility. Greig 
& Regan (2008: 772) also highlight that violence levels pertain to the ‘immediate, current 
costs of conflict experienced by the warring parties,’ while other factors present more of ‘a 
proxy of the longer-term costs of fighting.’ This underlines the visibility of violence. And it 
may even be suggested (e.g., Bercovitch & Houston, 2000) that violence is the only conflict 
characteristic so visible that allows the disputants to be aware that a moment is ‘ripe’ for 
resolution. 
Third, in terms of my contributions, the main finding strongly goes beyond Böhmelt 
(2015) in that I am able to show which underlying mechanism leads to the diffusion of 
mediation from one regional crisis to another. In addition, my lack of support for H2 suggests 
that those studies arguing that the heuristic via learning and emulation may also work for 
previously failed mediations (Khong, 1992) or is unrelated to the success criterion altogether 
(Kebschull, 1994) are likely to be more valid in the mediation context than those works 
claiming that it is only learning from success that matters. Hence, learning and emulation 
seem to be given for the heuristic of similar crises, while the outcome of their mediation 
attempts is unlikely to be of crucial importance. 
Coming to the control covariates, most of them display results, which are in line with the 
previous literature (see Wallensteen & Svensson, 2014).17 Also, despite the built-in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Note, however, when including spatial lags, model coefficients (excluding the spatial coefficient ρ, though) 




heteroskedasticity of the linear m-STAR model, the results there are virtually identical to the 
probit regression models. Due to space limitations, I focus on the statistically significant 
results that are robust across models. First, although only the spatial lag based on violence is 
significant, my models strongly support the notion that longer, more violent, and ethnic crises 
are more likely to see mediation interventions. That is, while a diffusion effect is largely 
missing for these variables, these domestic, unit-specific characteristics still do attract 
mediation both from a supply and demand side. When raising Violence by one unit, the 
probability of mediation onset increases by about 7-8 percentage points according to the m-
STAR models. In light of the finding for WViolence discussed above, it should be noted that it is 
more likely that a higher level of violence only affects the likelihood of mediation onset 
positively at the ‘domestic level,’ but that higher intensity as such matters less at the 
international level: according to WViolence, crises that are more similar in their levels of 
violence drive diffusion, and this may be unrelated to a high level of violence per se. 
For Ethnic crisis, I obtain a slightly higher substantive effect of about 13-17 percentage 
points (when moving from 0 to 1 for this variable), while the marginal effect of Duration (ln) 
is at 0.21. Hence, ethnic crises and those lasting for a long time may indeed be more difficult 
to settle, thus signaling that these are the hard cases, which are most in need for mediation 
(Gartner & Bercovitch, 2006).  
Finally, Geostrategic salience is negatively signed and significant in all models. In more 
intuitive ways, increasing Geostrategic salience by one unit decreases the probability of 
mediation by about 8.5 percentage points: the more salient a particular crisis is from a 
geostrategic perspective, the less likely it is that mediation onset occurs.  
 
Conclusion 
Mediation is driven by the demand of the belligerents and the supply of the third parties in a 
26 
 
conflict (Beardsley & Greig, 2009). The previous literature largely focused on ‘unit-specific’ 
characteristics, which neglected the importance of ‘trans-unit’ influences. If the latter have 
been considered, there was merely geographical proximity taken into account and it remained 
unclear whether a genuine diffusion mechanism was at work (Böhmelt, 2015). 
I presented theoretical arguments and empirical evidence for why such a genuine 
‘neighborhood effect’ (Buhaug & Gleditsch, 2008) may indeed be present. I focused on 
common conflict characteristics as ties between crises and claimed that the actors’ decision-
making regarding supply and demand of mediation may be influenced by a learning-
emulation heuristic based on these shared characteristics. The empirical analysis 
demonstrated that mediation travels across crises that are similar in their level of violence. 
Similarities in other aspects such as salience and protracted or ethnic conflicts do not matter, 
however. 
This research thus contributes in various ways to the literatures on mediation, policy 
diffusion, and networked international politics. Yet, several avenues for further research 
exist. First, if mediation diffuses across crises due to a similar violence level and, as I argued, 
the actors’ employed learning-emulation heuristic, we might also observe that specific 
mediation techniques, e.g., facilitative, procedural, and directive/manipulation strategies, 
travel (see Melin, 2015). Similarly, the patterns I observed for mediation might apply for 
other forms of conflict management/resolution such as arbitration, adjudication, or 
peacekeeping; and it may well be that mediation travels via other channels linking crises, e.g., 
colonial history of countries or states’ membership in intergovernmental organizations, other 
than similarities in regional crises’ level of violence.  
Second, my theory and the empirical strategy for testing it do not assume that the same 
mediator intervenes across conflicts. Belligerents and potential mediators observe what is 
happening in international affairs and based on their learning from and emulation of other 
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conflicts, even if the actors there are different from the current context, might employ the 
same strategy. However, Melin (2015) or Böhmelt (2013) show that the effects we observe 
for mediation onset and effectiveness become stronger when taking the mediator’s identify 
into account. That is, learning and emulation should be more present if the same mediator 
intervenes in different crises. 
Finally, my work may also provide critical insights for policymakers’ and practitioners’ 
understanding of how conflict management works. Specifically, domestic or unit-specific 
factors matter for mediation, but international influences in the form of diffusion as well. In 
turn, my research has a clear policy implication: since learning from and emulating previous 
mediations in other crises increases the chances that mediation occurs in some other, 
similarly violent conflicts, then mediators may have an especially strong (and never before 
realized) impact on the futures of every other, similarly violent dispute.  
In light of this, although my work demonstrates that the degree of effectiveness of 
previous crises hardly matters for the phenomenon of mediation onset (H2), it may well 
influence the prospects of success in the current crisis. Put differently, if mediation does 
indeed diffuse due to learning from and emulating other crises with similar violence patterns, 
it seems plausible that the strategies used in that earlier conflict to bring about a peaceful 
resolution will also work in the current dispute. Conversely, those techniques and strategies 
that did not work in an earlier, similar crisis are unlikely to work in the current context. From 
a scholarly point of view, we need to examine a different dependent variable, though, to fully 
address this: mediation effectiveness. 
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